grievances can be directed into ethnic tension, then the probability of mass violence could increase.
The paper sets out to examine how the Kosovo arrangement affected the Crimean case and whether the prospects for a sustainable peace are better or worse for it. Our primary question is if Kosovo's self-determination is inherently tied to its context within the Yugoslav Wars and the international intervention that came with it, then to what degree does the case shed light on a somewhat similar case of co-ethnics, religious differences and a weakened state?
With interesting Kosovo connotations, we argue that the current low levels of contention in Crimea are two-fold. First, as Ukrainian foreign policy has moved away from a pro-Western orientation to that of a positive relationship with Russian, the Crimea issue lacks contemporary salience. Secondly, Crimea remains unchallenged by the Ukrainian political process in the post-Orange Revolution era. At the same time, we argue that the centreperiphery relations in Ukraine have the potential to lead to conflict as Kiev attempts to reassert its authority in the region through land reform. In these ways, we find that explanations of the Crimean case can gain from the Kosovo example.
In order to answer our central research question, we focus on setting out the case for the propensity of conflict in Crimea. Within this discussion, the paper is broken down into four sections. The first section compares the Kosovo and Crimea cases, highlighting the role of geo-politics, centre-periphery relations, social conditions and ethnic politics. The second section looks at the post-Soviet circumstances of ethno-politics in Crimea leading up to the 'Orange Revolution' of 2004. Third, we analyse the geo-politics surrounding the Crimea case, focusing on the role of the Russian Federation as regional hegemon, kin-state and key stakeholder in the Black Sea region. Fourth, we examine the changing local conditions and their impact on the prospect for peace in Crimea. We finish with a conclusion that reinforces our theoretically informed central argument that land reform has the potential to ignite conflict on the peninsula.
Crimea through the Kosovo Lens: an attempt at comparison
We begin by looking at Crimea through an analytical model derived from the Kosovo case as a means to allow us to see Crimea through the Kosovo lens. Having ended with the declaration of independence and the recognition of a self-proclaimed republic by a number of states, the conflict in Kosovo put into life a wave of debates in Ukraine and abroad on the analogies between the Kosovo and Crimean cases. This debate was not new. Throughout the 4 post-Cold War period, the two autonomous regions have been compared especially in terms of how the international community wished to treat them. For instance, the then Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE) sought to use the Kosovo autonomous character in Crimea as a route to stability 4 only to have the role model reversed five years later as Crimea was used as a good example for Kosovo. 5 However, similarities between the driving forces and dynamics of these two conflict situations are not so evident.
We argue that the best way to ascertain either differences or likenesses of these cases is to compare them upon a number of criteria generated by a reference to the literature on Kosovo.
We look at four factors: a) geo-politics, b) centre-periphery relations, c) social conditions and d) ethnic politics.
Kosovo literature

Geo-politics
We begin with the most obvious comparative question: How do geo-politics shape separatist movements? Andrew Cottey (2009) (2009, p.593) . This ambiquity and perhaps end to Western intervention raises issues for the probability of conflict in Crimea. In the same article, Second, the Crimea peninsula and the Black Sea are held as geo-strategically important by
Ukraine and Russia, which may explain why the processes of radicalisation and deradicalisation of the conflict in the Crimea has attracted so much attention. Historically, Crimea was built and perceived as a 'regional military base' and outpost for Russia and later for the USSR -a unique place (due to its natural and geographic conditions) for the location 6 of submarine bases, warship ports and air force bases. The geostrategic significance of the Crimea may be explained by its location in the Black Sea. As contemporary strategic studies would suggest, the extent of sea coast plays a key role in defence and encourages a preponderance of parties to show interest, which potentially could lead to conflict in the Black Sea. The existing balance of forces in the Black Sea region between NATO countries and Russia calls forth the geostrategic significance of Crimea and the price which Russia is willing to pay for control over the territory. Here, akin to Russia's role in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it is not so important for Russia to anchor its control over the territory legally, where actual control can be gained outside of extending traditional sovereignty over the peninsula.
Russia's interest in Crimea as a strategic defence of its southern region brings us back to the international dynamics of separatist movements. We should expect kin-states to get involved in host-state affairs, whether as Davis and Moore argue to deepen or dampen the potential for conflict. At the same time, we can see in both of our cases that the role of kin-states around the issue of ethnicity has been muted. Albania's ability to effect change in Kosovo was minimal which led to a position of inaction (on positive assistance for or restrictive control over the KLA). Russia, on the other hand, is in a different position yet its focus on ethnicity beyond other geo-political concerns is minimal perhaps because there are few reasons to resent being Slavic in Crimea. More importantly, Russia sees a Ukrainian Crimea as a way to influence regional politics. As we will argue further on, the geo-political context means that neither Ukraine nor Russia have an interest in changing the status quo.
Centre-Periphery relations
In his book, Strong Societies and Weak States, Joel Migdal (1988) argues that conflict is likely to occur as conceptions of the polity are challenged by competing claims of resource allocation. The weaker the state, the less it is able to challenge alternative sources of power.
As a response, peripheral actors see an opportunity to challenge the weak centre. In contrast to the Yugoslav case where the centre was strong, but lacked international legitimacy, Ukraine's state weakness in the 1990s, a number of shocks in the 1990s and the 2000s favoured an 'autonomisation' of the political and socio-economic processes on the peninsula that broke ties between the centre and the autonomous region. Finally, this post-Soviet 'condition' produced considerable tension between Kiev and Simferopol during Ukraine's "Orange Revolution". 
Social Conditions
The literature on civil wars and social movements also suggests that relative deprivation between regions would suggest a significant propensity for conflict (see for example Østby, Russians and Crimean Ukrainians consistently behave as one actor. So, both Slavic groups tend to support a Russian Crimea concept (heavy industry, special economic zone, territorial autonomy) over that of Ukraine, which says a great deal about the ethnic claims and grievances on the ground. This being said, it is also remarkable that the separatist claims have decreased despite a strong Russian orientation. Again, the Russian government itself has not 9 pressed for separatism but rather for a special status within Ukraine. These are the claims of the Crimean Slavic population.
Unlike the Kosovo case, where the conflict situation was shaped by long-standing socioeconomic inequality, ethnic grievance, exaggerated by weakening Yugoslavian state and ambitions of independence, the two main ethnic groups in Crimea do not experience significant socio-economic differences and ethnic hatreds. Although the Slavic and the Crimean Tatar communities often give different interpretations of events and decisions in domestic and foreign policy agendas, the value of integration is a more powerful factor than risks of disintegration and conflict. The Ukrainian state formally does not recognize any ethnic minorities in Ukraine, since the state did not want to grant the status of minority to any group in order not to give preferences to the largest minority in Ukraine -the Russians.
Notably, the legislation of the Crimean autonomous region is more attentive to the rights of minorities than the Ukrainian state itself. The comparison between Crimea and Kosovo highlights some interesting findings which leads us to investigate the Crimean case further in the next sections. Firstly, the international context is different between the two regions. While
Kosovo was seen as a victim by many in the international community (US, EU, and UN),
Crimea does not hold this status. If we take out the politics of such claims, we can see that the constellation of invested actors in the international community is different in the two cases. In other words, the external pressure to find a solution will be focused on internal arrangements of accommodation rather than secession. Secondly, as we shall see later, the centre-periphery relations in Crimea are distinctly different from the Kosovo case, in terms of the status of central government and the autonomous region. Thirdly, while Kosovo remains a relatively poor region in the Balkans, Crimea has much better economic conditions vis-à-vis Ukraine as a whole. Finally, the ethnic politics of the region are complicated by a third group in the region, the Crimean Tatars. The case of Crimea then plays at two different levels, between centre and periphery and between Slavic (Russian and Ukrainian) and Tatar. The circumstances make for a delicate scenario.
Contemporary Crimean separatism
The question of whether the threat of separatism is still relevant for Crimea is widely Russia, has grown to over 50%, thus, the social base for the separatist movement in the Crimea in the last decade has grown (Razumkov Centre 2011).
In the meantime, relations between the different conflicting parties inside Crimea, as well as Having said this, we argue that two processes can make the radicalisation of violence in
Crimea realisable in the short-term. The first is the weakening of the Ukrainian state through the criminalisation of state institutions, low public trust in the government, socio-economic inequality, institutional exclusion, and the spread of alternative societal structures which have developed into a survival culture. The second is the Ukrainian government's policy of land privatisation in Crimea. Under these conditions of a weak state and the uncertainty of property rights, the privatisation of land could to a radicalisation, violence, enmity, and the mobilisation of social groups under ethnic slogans (see Mason 1998) .
Under the Constitution of Ukraine adopted in 1996, Ukraine has an asymmetric unitary state system. The status of Crimea and the power of local authorities are unique in Ukraine. The decision to restore the Crimean autonomous region, which previously existed between 1921-1945 and was renewed in 1991 in a referendum, avoided any radicalisation or violence which would have led to a further separation of Crimea in the 1990s. However, the restoration of the autonomous region did not resolve the contradictions in legal status nor Ukrainian suzerainty over of Crimea. Moreover, the way in which the referendum question was formulated within 11 the USSR as opposed to an independent Ukraine is legally questionable. We identify several actors who seek power and access to resources in Crimea: a) the local elite (both Slavic and Tatar), b) the central government and elite in Kiev (both ruling elite and the opposition), and c) external forces, primarily referring to Russia. In the meantime and foreseeable future none of the above actors is interested in the extension of a Crimean separatist movement that would potentially lead to the secession of the territory from Ukraine.
Rather, this constellation has arrived at an equilibrium of peace.
However, we argue that this equilibrium is not sustainable in its current form. Taking into account the collective grievances and dissatisfaction of the population with the results of socio-economic reforms, the escalation or de-escalation of conflict in the republic depends on the relations between local elites and Kiev, along with the intensity and close involvement of the central government with a solution for the socio-economic problems facing the autonomous region. Two further factors can disrupt the existing status quo: (1) changes in the demographic structure of the republic's population over the medium to long term, and (2) the dramatic weakening of the Ukrainian state and the resulting consequences of mass unrest.
Competing Movements, Competing Claims
7 The 1991 referendum posed 'the Crimean autonomous region republic should have to be restored as a subject of the USSR and a participant of the Soviet Union agreement'.
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The comparison of Kosovo shows Crimea to be in a stable equilibrium where no sides wish to upset the status quo. The same could have been said in Kosovo in the late 1970s however.
The key is that by the time there was large-scale violence in Kosovo, the existential threats of both camps had already become significantly salient as mobilizing forces. The ability to change this following the war in Bosnia and the increased pressure on Kosovo by the KLA and the Yugoslav National Army means that the convergence of interests at the regional, national and local levels were considered impossible to overcome. The Crimean case allows us to look back in time to when Kosovo too was considered stable in terms of claims made by Serbians and Albanians.
Interests of local pro-Russian (non-Tatar) elite
In defiance of popular opinion in Crimea, annexation to Russia is not an attractive scenario 
Interests of the political elite in Kiev
Neither group of political elites in Kiev (nationalist "pro-Ukrainian" and so-called "proRussian") is interested in the actual separation of Crimea from Ukraine, as neither seek to cede territory, resources, or prestige to Russia. At the same time, both groups play a part in a certain Crimea political discourse that perpetually problematizes the status of the region. Elite groups contribute to the possibility of conflict through the manipulation of public opinion and exaggerate the social problems, accentuate the contradictions and fundamentally lead to sharpened tensions.
For example, the most discussed and provocative solution of the Crimean puzzle is the termination of the autonomous region status, which if ever passed, would transform the republic into an ordinary administrative district within the unitary Ukrainian state. The proposition is often brought to the floor of the Ukrainian national parliament. The main idea of this proposal lies in the aspiration to eliminate the legal base for the possible separation of
Crimea from Ukraine. Obviously, the above 'solution' appears to be an evident way to escalate the situation in Crimea to conflict, since the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants would not agree to the termination of the autonomous region. In other words, as we have seen 14 before, so many claims can be made on Crimea that any move in any one direction would lead to a breakdown of the stable status quo rather than solve a 'frozen' condition.
Russia as a regional power broker
Since 
Role of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea
As discussed, the overwhelming number of academic publications on social tension, instability and the escalation of violence in the Crimea identify two main agents of separatism: (1) the pro-Russian Slavic majority and (2) the Russian State that through a foreign policy of sponsored pro-Russian non-governmental organisations and political parties realises a strategy of separation of Crimea from Ukraine (Kuzio, 2010) . Nevertheless, decreasing separatist attitudes on the peninsula have not brought about a deescalation of the local community's potential for conflict. Collective grievance has been channelled into discreet radical protests against the local authorities or local clashes that are not connected per se with separatist activities. Any separatist activity of the Tatar ethnic minority has been rarely analysed as a real phenomenon and a conflict factor in Crimea, but recent opinion polls show that at least 2% of Crimea's residents support separation of the Crimea and subsequent annexation of this territory to Turkey, bearing in mind that Crimean
Tatars constitute just over 12% of the regional population (Opinion Polls: Crimea, Razumkov
Centre, April-May 2011).
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The character of relations of the Crimean Tatars and central authorities in Kiev is unsteady.
During the 'Orange period' of Ukraine's history, the Tatar Mejlis became a regional ally of the then president Viktor Yuschenko and central government in Kiev. This Crimean Tatar alliance with Kiev and its pro-Ukrainian narrative became the only alternative to a Russian narrative for Crimea.
9
One important factor which fastened a convenient alliance between the Mejlis and the 'Orange' government was a predominance of the Russian-speaking Slavic community in the social structures of the republic. However, taking into account a series of consistent, consecutive actions towards a consolidation of the Tatar self-determination movements and legal reinforcement of the rights on self-determination of the Tatars on "their historical homeland", it would be inconsistent or at least too simple to consider the Mejlis as a stronghold of the statehood and territorial integrity of Ukraine in a strategic perspective.
In a tactical perspective given the current demographic status of Crimean Tatars, any separatist intention, openly declared by the Mejlis will in turn reinforce the Russian separatism and will change for worse the conditions for defence of the Tatar's political, social and economic rights. Any change from the status quo at this stage would accordingly provoke Russia to develop further a foreign and security policy in defending ethnic Russians Crimea.
Nevertheless, in a hypothetical conflict between the Tatar (then) majority, Slavic minority and Kiev, we would expect that Russia would use the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol to seek stability and the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Nevertheless, this is an unlikely short to medium term scenario.
The passport problem
Similar to Kosovo and its relation to Albania, citizenship and passports become a way to build loyalties and substantiate existing policies. In 1994 Ukraine started to issue the passports to 
Conclusion
In summary, although the Kosovo case is often used as an analogy and scenario of future radicalisation of violence and flash point in the Crimea, these cases are rather different.
Periodically raising social tensions in Crimea is more a consequence of the complex impact of 22 state weakness, inefficient public policy towards the autonomous region, and regional politics-cum-business in Simferopol, Kiev and Moscow, than a result of deeply rooted ethnic hatreds or social inequality between two ethnic groups. Undoubtedly, reliance on the shadow sector and semi-criminal networks, institutional exclusion, dissemination of alternative norms and practices of a survival culture contribute to the weaknesses of the Ukrainian state, and the further distancing between Crimea and Kiev.
Nevertheless, to date Crimean separatist tendencies are not irreversible, as shown. Any
Crimean separatist movements would more than likely result in open armed conflict and secession. In conclusion, we suggest that transparent privatisation, the formalisation of property rights, the rule of law, the respect for human rights, the de-politisation of public service, a culture of tolerance to "others" in the institutions of mass-media and education are necessary tools of the structural mechanisms of conflict prevention that can strengthen state institutions and anchor Crimea as an integral part of Ukraine as well as prevent a repeat of Kosovo in the autonomous region.
